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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

19 AUG 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

19 August 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10 - 16 AUGUST 1970

Moscow (3731 items)

FRG-USSR Treaty Talks	(1.5%)	11%
China	(7%)	5%
Indochina	(6%)	5%
Middle East	(5%)	4%
DPRK Liberation, 25th Anniversary	(0.3%)	4%
	(1%)	
Iraqi Party-Government Delegation in USSR	(1%)	2%
Nerve Gas Dumping	(1.5%)	2%
SALT in Vienna	(--)	1%

Peking (2482 items)

Domestic Issues	(24%)	26%
Indochina	(12%)	22%
[Cambodia	(9%)	19%]
Middle East	(8%)	11%
Sudan Government	(10%)	10%
Delegation Tour		
[in PRC		7%]
[in DPRK		3%]
South Yemen Government	(11%)	8%
Delegation in PRC		
Albanian Government	(--)	4%
Economic Delegation in PRC		
Congo-B National Day	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist routine propaganda, like the delegates at the Paris talks, repeat standard claims that the Nixon Administration is not sincere in professing to want a peaceful settlement and is in fact continuing its "aggressive" policy throughout Indochina. Continued comment decrying U.S. air strikes in Cambodia again predicts that they will not deter the "patriotic forces" from further victories.

The VNA account of the 12 August Paris session complains that Ambassador Bruce "rehashed his old contentions about the so-called prisoners-of-war problem," and President Nixon's 7 August announcement of Col. Frank Borman's tour to seek information on U.S. prisoners prompts critical comment in the Hanoi press on the 13th and 14th.

Peking media continue to publicize statements by Sihanouk and other members of his government, and on the 17th NCNA announces an agreement whereby the PRC will supply Sihanouk's government with "gratuitous military aid."

Peking does not criticize Soviet policy on Indochina. But Moscow's continuing polemic includes a Mandarin-language commentary on the 13th which again repeats the routine complaint that the Chinese leaders oppose "united action" in Indochina.

After a week's silence, Pathet Lao media are again publicizing communications on negotiations between Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma, including Souphanouvong's agreement to Khang Khay as the site for a meeting of plenipotentiaries. Moscow has welcomed the news of that agreement, while Peking maintains its total silence on the exchanges between the princes on negotiations.

COMMUNIST DELEGATES AT PARIS SESSION IMPUGN U.S. SINCERITY

At the 79th session of the Paris talks on 13 August PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien, speaking first, repeated standard complaints about alleged U.S. insincerity regarding a negotiated settlement

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and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.* He also repeated the charge that President Nixon has "repudiated" the two basic issues of the 10-point solution--U.S. troop withdrawal and the establishment of a provisional coalition government. He pointed again to President Nixon's "blatant" opposition to a "'negotiated'" coalition government in South Vietnam and his statement that the GVN negotiating position was on "all fours" with the U.S. stand. But Tien did not note that the President made these remarks during his 30 July Los Angeles press conference.

On the other hand, DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy did refer explicitly to the President's 30 July press conference in recalling--and deriding--his remark that the prospects for a negotiated settlement should be better now than before the Cambodian operation. The VNA account notes Vy's observation that the President's remark demonstrates a policy of seeking military victory and a position of strength and that it would be difficult to call this a serious negotiating attitude. The account does not report Vy's references to U.S. air strikes in direct support of Cambodian government forces as a "new serious escalation" in Cambodia, nor does it acknowledge his citation of Defense Secretary Laird's "tortuous arguments to justify these actions of the Nixon Administration."

Both Tien and Vy called for the United States to respond to the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution. Tien went on to repeat the formula, frequently used last year, that on the basis of the 10-point solution the PRG "is ready to reach an understanding with the parties to the effect of concluding agreements on an end to the war and the restoration of peace in South Vietnam."

* As was the case last week, Liberation Radio initially broadcast the LPA account of Tien's statement and subsequently--on 17 August--carried the full text. The DRV delegate's statement, as usual, has not been carried textually by Hanoi; there is only the VNA account, which is published regularly in the Hanoi press the day after the session.

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The VNA account glosses over Vy's comments on Ambassador Bruce's statement of the previous session and his remark that "President Nixon's words" regarding American interest in seeking a just peace and not a military victory "do not convince us." The account also leaves out Vy's reply to Ambassador Bruce's plea for avoidance of propaganda at the talks--his comment that President Nixon's "unconvincing" words are "precisely the 'propaganda to be avoided' if we want to bring the negotiations to success."

The VNA account reverts to standard practice in dismissing the allied delegates' statements in brief one-sentence characterizations. Thus, VNA says that GVN Ambassador Lam was "still bent on opposing" the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution and that Ambassador Bruce "repeated his old theme at the previous session and tried to avoid responding to the fundamental demands of the Vietnamese people--namely, the United States must withdraw totally, speedily and unconditionally U.S. and satellite troops from South Vietnam and abandon the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration." VNA thus totally obscures the thrust of Ambassador Bruce's remarks to the effect that both sides should examine each other's positions, dispense with debates over the origins of the war, and try to narrow differences through reasonable discussions.

In saying that Bruce "rehashed his old contentions about the so-called 'prisoners-of-war' problem," VNA does not indicate that he cited this as one of the central issues, along with troop withdrawals and a political settlement. (The VNA account last week did not acknowledge that Bruce mentioned any of these issues.)

Vietnamese communist media follow the customary practice of not publicizing the post-session press briefings; thus there is no acknowledgment of DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's statement that Xuan Thuy will return to the talks "soon." Xuan Thuy's last formal appearance at the sessions was at the 45th meeting on 4 December 1969. He did not leave Paris, however, until 11 May, arriving in Hanoi on the 17th. During his absence from the talks the DRV delegation was led first by DRV deputy delegation head Ha Van Lau and, since the 54th session on 12 February, by Nguyen Minh Vy.

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HANOI SCORES BORMAN MISSION ON U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR

President Nixon's 7 August announcement of Col. Frank Borman's tour to seek information on U.S. prisoners of war prompts critical comment in articles in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and the party organ NHAN DAN on 13 and 14 August, respectively. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN charges that the President appointed Borman and again raised the POW issue in an attempt to "whitewash" U.S.-GVN "crimes" in South Vietnam, especially after "the Con Son 'Tiger Cages' incident was brought to light," and to "fool American voters and gain more support for his party in the coming U.S. congressional elections."

NHAN DAN echoes the charge that Borman's appointment is a "new trick" to deceive public opinion. The party paper adds that "it has been noted" that the U.S. representatives at Paris "have babbled about this problem, but they have dodged discussion on the fundamental issues that the conference ought to settle." The article cites the President--in his 30 July press conference--as placing a high priority on the POW issue at Paris. It further scores the Administration for sending "one person after another to various countries" to call for the release of the prisoners, mentioning H. Ross Perot in this respect.* NHAN DAN notes that Borman began his trip on the 10th, but it does not indicate that Moscow was the first stop or give any indication of the other countries on his itinerary.

Both articles routinely assert that the DRV Government's policy toward the U.S. prisoners is correct and humane. They argue that the prisoners are "criminals" who fall under the DRV's jurisdiction and "should have been severely punished in conformity with DRV laws." Both also claim that the prisoners have been allowed to correspond with their families; NHAN DAN says in addition that the sick and wounded have been cared for and that a number of them have been released and returned to their families.

NHAN DAN, but not QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, comments that the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution, "to which the DRV government fully agrees,"

* The most recent spate of DRV comment on U.S. prisoners of war was last April in connection with a visit by Perot to Saigon and Vientiane. See FBIS TRENDS, 15 April 1970, pages 10-11.

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has unequivocally dealt with the settlement of captured U.S. airmen.* It charges that since the Nixon Administration has refused to use the 10-point solution as the basis for settling the Vietnam problem, it is responsible for prolonging the war and solving the U.S. POW problem.

CONTINUED CONDEMNATION OF U.S. AIR STRIKES IN CAMBODIA

HANOI AND THE FRONT The issue of U.S. combat air support for Cambodian government forces gets further attention in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 13th. Like earlier propaganda, it cites Western reports as documentation. However, it goes beyond last week's comment in referring to "Vietnamese communist" supply lines. It says the press reports have unmasked President Nixon's arguments, since he had "endlessly argued that the U.S. Air Force in Cambodia had restricted its activities to protecting the lives of the remaining U.S. troops in South Vietnam and that it attacked only the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese supply lines." (Earlier comment had interjected the editorial note that by "communist" supply lines, the United States meant "Cambodian patriots' supply lines.")

Citing Western reports, the commentary makes the standard point that even with combat air support the government forces are still weak. The commentary also quotes from a 5 July New York TIMES article on the role of air power and, perhaps inadvertently, includes a reference to the Ho Chi Minh trail: Foreign military specialists, it says, "tell of the ineffectiveness of the bombings of the Ho Chi Minh trail by B-52's."

Hanoi again denies the effectiveness of U.S. air power in Cambodia in a 13 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the Cambodian military situation. Stating that "the Lon Nol clique is still pinning much hope on U.S. air support," the commentary says REUTERS has reported that "in Kirirom, Kompong Thom, and many other places, all enemy aircraft have to fly very high in

* NHAN DAN does not go on to cite point nine of the solution which says merely that "to resolve the aftermath of the war," the parties will negotiate the release of the army men captured in the war. Point nine also holds the United States responsible for war damage in both North and South Vietnam.

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order to avoid fire from the ground" and that because of intense ground fire and the proximity of liberation troops to government positions, "fighter planes can do nothing."

MOSCOW While Moscow had previously avoided references to communist supply lines in Cambodia, some routine-level comment now acknowledges that Secretary Laird referred to interdiction of such supply lines in remarks at his 6 August press conference. A 12 August RED STAR article by Aleksey Leontyev scores intensified U.S. bombing, stressing civilian casualties, and says that the U.S. Air Force has been giving "direct support" to Saigon and Phnom Penh troops. With these facts, says Leontyev, journalists drove Laird into a corner at his 6 August press conference, and he tried to fend them off by saying that the American Air Force in Cambodia is only "'blocking the way' to 'cut the enemy's movement of men and materials' into South Vietnam."

A widely broadcast foreign-language commentary on the 11th attributes to Laird the comment that air action is directed against the communication lines of "Cambodia's resistance forces" and that the U.S. Air Force "is not giving direct support" to the Saigon and Phnom Penh ground troops. Thus the commentary, like Hanoi comment last week, obscures the Vietnamese communist role in Cambodia. It plays down the significance of the difference between interdiction and combat support, asking what difference it makes what the aircraft are supposed to be doing when they destroy the country and kill the people.

STATEMENT A statement by a spokesman of the Royal Government
BY RGNU of National Union, carried by the FUNK radio on
13 August and by NCNA on the 14th, denounces U.S.
"large-scale bombing of Cambodia with B-52's" as a "new escalation" of the war. It alludes to U.S. air support of ground operations when it says that Saigon and Bangkok troops "count on all kinds of U.S. support to carry out their dirty job on Cambodian territory," adding that U.S. aircraft bomb Khmer villages and cities daily. But there is no reference to the question of U.S. "air interdiction" of communist supply lines.

The statement is endorsed by a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman in a statement issued on the 15th.

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COMMENT ON CAMBODIAN MILITARY SITUATION, THAI "VOLUNTEERS"

Communist media take note of fighting in Cambodia with reports of military clashes in the provinces of Kompong Cham, Kompong Speu, Prey Veng, and Kompong Thom. Several specific engagements in recent weeks are noted in the 13 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary reviewing the military situation. The commentary, broadcast by Hanoi radio, claims that in the wake of the "resounding" victories in Kirirom in July and early August, the Cambodian armed forces have "repeatedly attacked government and GVN forces" everywhere and inflicted serious losses on them." The Cambodian liberation forces, according to the commentary, "have always held the initiative on all battlefields." It says also "it is obvious that Phnom Penh, the last den of the Lon Nol clique, is being threatened by the Khmer liberation armed forces from all sides."

Hanoi and Front media are not known to have mentioned the 14 August State Department announcement on U.S. plans to help finance Thai training of troops to be dispatched to Cambodia; but a 14 August Hanoi broadcast in Cambodian notes an AFP report on remarks on U.S. aid by Thai Prime Minister Thanom at a 13 August press conference.

PEKING On 15 August NCNA promptly acknowledged the State Department spokesman's announcement the day before that the United States has reached a tentative agreement to aid in financing the dispatch of some 3,000 "Thai troops" (omitting the explanation that they are to be "of Cambodian origin") to Cambodia along with 2,000 Cambodian troops now being trained in Thailand. NCNA calls the agreement part of the Nixon Administration's scheme to make "Asians fight Asians" and charges that it constitutes a "grave move" to intensify and enlarge the war in Indochina.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, carried in the Peking domestic service on the 14th--in advance of the State Department's announcement--scores the "Thai reactionaries" in general for submission to the U.S. "masters," citing "the step-up of the dispatch of aggressor troops" from Thailand to Cambodia, the dispatch of Thai aircraft to bomb Cambodian territory, and the training of troops for the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique."

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MOSCOW TASS also reported the State Department's announcement promptly on the 15th, citing the spokesman as saying that Washington will assist Thailand in sending 5,000 "Thai volunteers" to Cambodia. The report does not explain the nature of the volunteers. It charges the United States with pushing forward plans to implement aggression by using its allies in Asia. (A 12 August IZVESTIYA article on U.S. efforts to draw Thailand into the war had cited, among other things, a report in a Thai paper that a group of 3,000 "Thai volunteers" would be sent into Cambodia at the end of the month.) On the 16th TASS reported that Senator Church opposed the plan as a violation of the provision in the Cooper-Church amendment banning the financing of other armies in Cambodia.

A 16 August IZVESTIYA article scores the State Department announcement on the financing of "5,000 Thai 'volunteers'" and reviews Thai involvement in Cambodia over the past few weeks, including Thai air force missions and military aid to the Lon Nol regime--part of President Nixon's "Guam doctrine" of pursuing aggression through the proxy of U.S. allies in Asia.

SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT'S LEGALITY ARGUED, PRAGUE EMBASSY SEIZED

In his "open letter to kings, heads of state, and heads of government of nonaligned countries," carried by NCNA from 9 through 14 August, Sihanouk argues his case on the illegality of the regime which overthrew him and solicits recognition of his Royal Government of National Union (RGNU). He says his government has established its administration in "the greater part of Cambodia," and leads a "genuine army." Further pressing the claim that the Lon Nol regime is illegal, an 11 August RGNU statement carried by the FUNK radio on the 13th and by NCNA on the 14th, declares that all decrees and treaties adopted or signed by the "clique" are "illegal and null and void."

Sihanouk's claim to control "the greater part of Cambodia" is made more specific in a statement by RGNU minister Thiounn Prasith disclaiming responsibility for the safety of Western journalists in "liberated zones." As carried by NCNA on the 15th and by the FUNK radio on the 17th, the statement says the liberation army now controls two-thirds of Cambodian territory.*

* The first known claim of control over two-thirds of the territory appeared in a 20 July RGNU statement on the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements, but propaganda since then has frequently reverted to the claim of "half" of the territory.

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In a "special message" calling on Cambodian intellectuals to abandon the Lon Nol regime, as carried by NCNA on 18 August, Sihanouk alleges that the Cambodian National Liberation Army has "completely encircled" the capital, and he cites a report in the 4 July issue of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT to the effect that Phnom Penh is "hemmed in and practically isolated."

MINISTERS IN "LIBERATED ZONE" In his "open letter" Sihanouk repeats the claim that three RGNU ministers, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Yuon, are in Cambodia and have their "headquarters" in a "liberated zone." They speak to the nation, Sihanouk says, over the FUNK radio "set up in the same zone."* Sihanouk takes issue with "propaganda" of the Lon Nol regime to the effect that the three ministers were "murdered by Sihanouk a few years ago," rejoining that if this were so the Pracheachon party "with the three ministers as its leaders" would never have agreed to join the FUNK--which, Sihanouk says, it did the day after the coup.

This is the first time these three ministers have been identified with the Pracheachon. This Cambodian CP-front organization, founded in July 1955 and subsequently suppressed by Sihanouk, resurfaced on 3 May 1970 when VNA carried its central committee statement, dated 23 April, expressing support for Sihanouk's 23 March appeal. On 22 May Liberation Radio had cited the FUNK information bureau for a report of a 7-8 May meeting held in a Cambodian "liberated area" by the "Cambodian People's Movement of Militant Solidarity," a group said to be affiliated with the FUNK. The three ministers were said to be present but were not named in connection with the Pracheachon; another individual was said to be the representative of that group.

Sihanouk's "open letter" further rebuts claims that the three ministers are dead, saying that Ministers Chau Seng and Thiounn Mumm and Ambassador Sian An are "intimate friends" of the three and are "at the disposal" of the nonaligned leaders to testify to the "perfectly real presence" of the three in Cambodia. Sihanouk makes similar claims that the three ministers are alive in his "special message" to Cambodian intellectuals.

* This is the first available claim in communist media that the radio is located in Cambodia. Although AFP reported on 1 August that Hanoi announced that the radio was located in Stung Treng, no such Hanoi announcement was monitored by FBIS.

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EMBASSY IN Peking's NCNA and the FUNK radio have been
 PRAGUE publicizing statements by Sihanouk and his govern-
 ment in connection with the take-over of the
 Cambodian embassy in Prague by the second secretary on behalf
 of the FUNK. The propaganda includes a message from Prime
 Minister Penn Nouth congratulating the secretary for joining
 the FUNK, a similar RGNU statement, a telegram from Penn Nouth
 to Premier Strougal demanding that the Czechoslovak Government
 raise its "blockade" of the embassy, and a similar message from
 Sihanouk to President Svoboda which also says that the time
 has come for Czechoslovakia to make clear its position on
 recognition of a Cambodian government. On its own authority
 Peking carries brief NCNA reports of the embassy take-over
 and of the "inhuman measures" taken by the Czechoslovak
 authorities to seal off the embassy as well as measures to
 provide "diplomatic protection" to the ousted Cambodian
 ambassador.

The only Prague mention of the episode since the initial
 CTK report on 10 August is a brief CTK report of a Czechoslovak
 Foreign Ministry announcement on the 18th. The announcement
 says that "political disputes" among members of the embassy
 resulted in its seizure by one of the diplomats and a group of
 students. It adds that the laws of the host country were thus
 violated and that Czechoslovak authorities have taken measures
 to ensure public order and personal security of members of the
 mission. It does not mention that the seizure was on behalf
 of Sihanouk's FUNK.

PEKING SIGNS AID AGREEMENT WITH SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT

The signing of an agreement on China's "gratuitous military aid"
 to Cambodia in 1970 is announced by NCNA on 17 August. PRC
 and RGNU Premiers Chou En-lai and Penn Nouth were present at the
 signing ceremony. The NCNA report also reveals for the first
 time that the PRC provided the RGNU with a loan in May. Peking
 has not previously referred explicitly to aid for the new
 government, limiting itself to expressions of "support."

Although Sihanouk has recently visited both the DRV and the DPRK,
 presumably to solicit assistance, no aid agreement with either
 regime has been announced so far. The DRV has been reticent about
 publicly promising aid. During his visit from 25 May to 8 June,
 Sihanouk expressed gratitude for North Vietnamese "aid" and

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"material assistance" and DRV media carried his remarks, but DRV spokesmen did not go beyond promises of "support." A joint communique on the visit of a RGNU and FUNK delegation to Laotian "liberated areas," carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on 31 July and by NCNA on 1 August, specifically noted that the two peoples "enjoy direct assistance of the fraternal Vietnamese people." The VNA summary of the communique omitted this reference, although mutual "assistance" among the three Indochinese peoples was mentioned in slogans on the anniversaries of the DRV August Revolution and National Day.

North Korea's Kim Il-song promised Sihanouk "support by all necessary means" and "moral and material active assistance" in various speeches during Sihanouk's visit from 15 June to 1 July.

CURRENT MILITARY ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The intensified military action in the northern provinces of South Vietnam is discussed in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of the 17th. As summarized by VNA the same day, it says that the PLAF attacks in the Tri-Thien-Hue area "are shaking the defensive posture of the enemy in an important strategic theater of operations." Hailing the PLAF exploits in the area from 30 July to 10 August, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN gives special praise to the area PLAF in their "plane-hunting movement," claiming that 58 planes were shot down in the 10-day period and observing that the zone is the "best area of South Vietnam in this exploit and in foiling the U.S. so-called 'massive bombing.'" The paper adds that U.S.-GVN forces have failed to maintain their jungle and mountainous bases and are facing "more and more difficulties."

On 12 August Hanoi broadcast an article by "Chinh Nam" from the 11 August NHAN DAN which deals with exploits during the past six months in the Southern Trung Bo area. The article alleges, among other things, that the PLAF made deep, accurate, and continuous thrusts at the allies' key organs, including those in Da Lat; heightening their spirit of self-reliance, it says, the zonal localities endeavored to "recruit forces locally," strongly developed their capabilities, and actively attacked the enemy. Singled out as "outstanding" in attaining "glorious victories" were the forces in Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, Binh Tuy, and Ninh Thuan provinces.

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DRV ARMY PAPER STRESSES VILLAGE-LEVEL ORGANIZATION IN SOUTH

Continued attention to the importance of guerrilla warfare* in South Vietnam and unusual concern over the communist political and organizational position at the local level appear in an 11 August Hanoi radio broadcast of a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the same day entitled "Push Forward the People's War in Villages and Hamlets."

The commentary states that compatriots and fighters are already "paying great attention to developing people's war in the villages and hamlets" at a time when the allies are maintaining their pressure and channeling "considerable forces" to controlling these areas. It says that the people and liberation forces are foiling enemy plots under slogans emphasizing the need to retain control of territory and enjoining: "leaders, stick to the people; people, stick to the land; guerrillas, stick to the enemy." By implementing these slogans, the commentary says, cadres and guerrillas have been able to mobilize the peasants to persevere in fighting, build powerful political and military forces to attack the enemy, and "seize and retain control of their areas."

Experience demonstrates, according to the commentary, that "the most important thing" is to attack and maintain an "offensive strategy," since only by attacking can one "correctly assess" the balance of forces between the two sides at the local level. "Without an aggressive, revolutionary spirit," the commentary argues, "one cannot appreciate the full power of the revolution and will tend to overestimate the enemy and not dare to mobilize the masses to fight, even when the opportunity comes and the masses have risen up." The commentary adds that the "consolidation and development of the political power of the revolutionary masses is the primary way of stepping up the people's war in villages and hamlets." It explains that "when one has a political base, he will have a political force to carry out the political struggle and propaganda work and to expand and coordinate it with the military struggle." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN adds that a "firm and strong political base guarantees that the liberation armed forces will have stable support, a source of replenishment, and a springboard for attacks in vital areas."

* The strategic position of guerrilla warfare was highlighted in a 10 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, carried the same day by Hanoi radio. The article spoke of the "decisive" effect guerrilla warfare has in thwarting pacification and added that "guerrilla warfare has never played a more important role than it is playing during the current phase" of the war.

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The commentary says that each village and hamlet must have strong guerrilla forces, and it defines the guerrillian's role as one in which "they must wipe out the cruel agents, discover and eliminate informants and spies, and act in such a way that even if the enemy occupies the villages and hamlets he still cannot control the local situation." It projects a sense of urgency in concluding that "never has the question of pushing forward the people's war in villages and hamlets been as important as it is now," adding that "the people's war in villages and hamlets is the foundation for the development of the entire revolutionary war."

PRG SHORT-TERM Liberation Radio on the 14th and LPA on
EMULATION DRIVE the 16th publicized a 10 August circular,
 No. 93/TP/TCP, issued by the Office of
PRG President Kuyh Tan Phat ordering the launching of a short-term emulation drive from 15 August to 5 September to mark the 19 August Revolution Day, the 2 September National Day, and the 3 September anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death and at the same time prepare for the 10th anniversary of the founding of the NFLSV in December. Like the directives for innumerable previous emulation campaigns, the PRG circular, among other things, calls on the liberation forces and people to score "greater and more brilliant exploits," to smash the GVN's pacification program, and to fulfill Ho's wishes and "liberate" the South.

HANOI PROTESTS ALLEGED B-52 STRIKES IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE

VNA and Hanoi radio on 15 August released a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest of the 13th which again charges the United States with B-52 strikes and shelling in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The spokesman claims that "many aircraft, including B-52's," bombed Huong Lap village "for five straight days ending 10 August"* and that U.S. artillery from south of the DMZ shelled Vinh Son village on 9 August. Noting that both villages are in the northern part of the DMZ, the spokesman in standard fashion "severely condemned these criminal acts" and demanded an end to all acts of encroachment on DRV sovereignty and security.

Hanoi radio had claimed on 6 August that the people and armed forces of Hoa Binh Province, "competing to score achievements to greet" the 25th anniversaries of the August Revolution and the DRV founding, downed an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane that day. The alleged downing brought Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to 3,359.

* The last previous DRV charges of the U.S. use of B-52's appeared in a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on 28 July. See the TRENDS of 29 July 1970, pages 9-10.

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LAOS: SOUVANNA PHOUMA, SOUPHANOUVONG CONTINUE CONTACTS

After a week's silence, Pathet Lao media are again commenting on the communications between Princes Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma regarding negotiations. On 12 August the Pathet Lao news agency reported a statement by the Alliance Committee of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces praising the dispatch of Souphanouvong's envoy to Vientiane at the end of July. On 3 and 4 August Pathet Lao media had reported the envoy's arrival in Vientiane on 31 July to deliver Souphanouvong's message to Souvanna Phouma, but the Pathet Lao reports did not mention that the message was actually delivered on 3 August.*

Pathet Lao radio reported on 14 August that Souphanouvong's envoy, Tiao Souk Vongsak, called on Souvanna Phouma on the 11th to inform him that Souphanouvong had "accepted" Souvanna Phouma's proposal, in his 25 June message, that Khang Khay be the site of a meeting between "plenipotentiary representatives of the two princes." On the 15th the Pathet Lao news agency carried a message from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma dated 27 July (it is not clear whether this is the one delivered by Tiao Souk Vongsak on the 3rd or on the 11th) in which he said "I have decided to appoint my high plenipotentiary representative to meet your representative to discuss questions aimed at creating a favorable situation for the meeting of the Lao parties concerned for the settlement of the Lao problem." The news agency did not quote the message as mentioning Khang Khay, however.

On 18 August the Pathet Lao news agency carried a Souphanouvong message to Souvanna dated the 13th which condemned the United States for "introducing Saigon troops" into Saravane Province on the 9th and said this followed the dispatch of "many Thai regular battalions" to take part in the fighting in Laos. The message warned that, coming at a time when the two princes have agreed on a meeting of plenipotentiaries, the U.S. action only makes the situation "more complicated and could but worsen the prospect of that meeting." (It is unclear if this is the message referred to in a 15 August Vientiane broadcast which said Tiao Souk Vongsak had delivered a message that day to Souvanna Phouma from Souphanouvong which concerned "only military problems.") The Pathet Lao news agency also reported

* See the 5 August FBIS TRENDS, pages 15-16.

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an NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement dated the 15th which repeated the complaint about the Saigon and Thai troops and the warning about the effect on negotiations.

An 18 August Pathet Lao news agency commentary accuses the Vientiane side of trying to "hinder" the plenipotentiaries' meeting. It says that the Vientiane side appointed a "government" delegation to begin "formal negotiations with the NLHS, thus rejecting the meeting between the representatives of the two princes under the pretext of 'gaining time.'" The commentary charges that by appointing a "government" delegation to negotiate with the other side, which it calls a "political party," the Vientiane side is making an "arrogant claim," since the Vientiane regime itself is "nothing but the administration of a party which the NLHS does not recognize." Describing the Laotian situation as "extremely complicated," the commentary concludes that a preliminary meeting of representatives of the two princes is necessary to prepare for "the parties interested to meet."

Pathet Lao media have not been heard to acknowledge reports from Vientiane and Western media that Soth Pethrasi, the Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane, will go to Sam Neua. On the 17th AFP reported under a Paris dateline that his trip concerns the "impasse" over a "preliminary meeting" and over Vientiane's appointment of a "government" delegation.*

MOSCOW Moscow has greeted Souvanna Phouma's talks with the envoy and the agreement to hold talks in Khang Khay with a domestic service commentary which reports--inaccurately--that the Vientiane cabinet agreed to an NLHS proposal on holding talks in Khang Khay. The Moscow commentator says this news "has been received with deep satisfaction by all those for whom the interests of peace and the neutrality of Laos are dear." It adds that the "U.S. military intervention" is what hinders a settlement.

PEKING Peking has not mentioned the exchange of messages between the Laotian princes on negotiations, but on the 18th NCNA did promptly report the 15 August NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement condemning the U.S. dispatch of "Saigon puppet units" into Saravane Province. Peking's version omits the statement's warning about the effect on prospects for a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the princes.

* On 13 August London REUTERS reported that the Vientiane government appointed a 9-man delegation composed of both neutralists and rightists.

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HANOI AND THE FRONT Hanoi's VNA has briefly reported that Souphanouvong has accepted Khang Khay as the place for a meeting of plenipotentiaries as well as the other messages which have been publicized in Pathet Lao media. On the 18th Hanoi radio reported the message from Souphanouvong and the NLHS Central Committee statement condemning the dispatch of Saigon troops and warning about the effect on a meeting. On the 19th VNA summarized a NHAN DAN article condemning the U.S. dispatch of Saigon troops to Laos as a "new war crime," though without mentioning the effect on meetings. Liberation Radio briefly reported the NLHS Central Committee statement on the Saigon troops, also without mentioning the warning about the meetings; like Hanoi media, however, a Liberation Radio broadcast in Cambodian did pick up a Pathet Lao report of the 11 August meeting between Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong's emissary, thereby acknowledging that contacts are taking place.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW DISMISSES ISRAELI CHARGES OF UAR CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS

Moscow's first acknowledgment of Israeli charges that the UAR was violating the cease-fire by building up its antiaircraft defenses in the canal zone came on the 15th--two days after Defense Minister Dayan first made the charge. It was not until the 17th that Moscow explicitly acknowledged that Israel was charging Cairo with bringing surface-to-air missiles close to the Suez Canal, and that the UAR had "officially refuted" these assertions. The Moscow reports on the 17th countercharged that Israel is trying to wreck the 7 August cease-fire agreement and block Jarring's mission.

The 16 August PRAVDA referred to unspecified "provocative attempts" by Israel to wreck the cease-fire agreement and "blame the UAR," but the specifics of the complaint did not appear in the Soviet press until the 18th, when PRAVDA carried a TASS report. The first press comment comes in a Kudryavtsev article in IZVESTIYA's evening edition that day which, judging from available versions, does not spell out the nature of the Israeli allegations. Propaganda in general takes little note of U.S. statements and press reports on the Israeli charges; there have been no references to methods of cease-fire surveillance nor to the clauses of the cease-fire agreement made public by Dayan on the 13th.

At the same time, Moscow has refrained from exploiting reports of Israeli military operations against Lebanon and Jordan; it has continued to welcome the cease-fire as a first important step toward a political solution, and to insist on the need for full implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and particularly for Israeli withdrawal from "all" occupied Arab territory.

CHARGES OF UAR VIOLATIONS A domestic service broadcast on the 15th made Moscow's first reference to the "rumors" spread by Tel Aviv "in the last few days" that the UAR is "supposedly building up its military strength" in the Suez Canal zone. About an hour later, an Arabic-language broadcast noted Israeli claims

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that Egypt was using the cease-fire "to reinforce its anti-aircraft defense forces" in the Suez Canal area, and reported Cairo radio as saying that "nothing has taken place" to support such accusations. A foreign-language commentary by Krichevskiy, also on the 15th, claimed the Israeli leaders were resorting to various maneuvers to "nullify the first success" on the road to a peaceful solution of the Middle East dispute, leveling "calumnies" against the UAR in the past few days that the Egyptians "are staging transfer movements" in the Suez Canal area. The entire world knows, the commentary added, that the UAR is complying with the cease-fire "unconditionally."

On the 17th the specifics of the Israeli complaint are noted, with TASS and Moscow's domestic service reporting that Israeli Prime Minister Meir "again repeated concoctions" that Cairo had allegedly violated the cease-fire agreement by bringing surface-to-air missiles closer to the Suez Canal. The items also cited the EGYPTIAN MAIL for the report that Israel needs the "myth about Egypt's sending new missile installations into the Suez Canal zone" to block Jarring's mission and to press for new U.S. arms deliveries.

In what is apparently the first Soviet acknowledgment that Israel has complained formally to the United Nations, a Soltan foreign-language commentary on the 18th says that rather than aid the Jarring mission, the Israeli Government is sending "one absurd complaint after another" to the United Nations, claiming that Cairo "advanced its surface-to-air missiles toward the Suez Canal after 7 August, that is, after the cease-fire came into force." Soltan says the UAR has "officially refuted" charges that it is "changing its missile sites," and adds that "even Washington" has "doubted Israel's complaints and advised Tel Aviv to begin talks as soon as possible." He suggests that Washington "could ask Israel more seriously" to observe its undertakings.

Kudryavtsev's article in the 18 August IZVESTIYA, as reported by TASS and broadcast by Moscow radio in Arabic, does not directly refute the Israeli charges. According to the Arabic-language version, Kudryavtsev says that the objectives of the charges are so obvious that U.S. Defense Secretary Laird--in his 16 August TV interview--"felt obliged to rebuke its authors." Kudryavtsev applauds the first "modest steps" toward a political settlement but notes that because of the "mutual prejudices and

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mistrust" in the region, considerable efforts will be required by "all sides" interested in a peaceful settlement, and "energy and flexibility" on the part of Jarring. He claims that Tel Aviv's "clamor" over UAR "violations" of the cease-fire illustrates its fear of a peaceful settlement, and he argues that for such a solution to proceed in a normal manner, "even the slightest elements" of a positions-of-strength policy must be discarded. He goes on to assert the Soviet belief that "the more we strengthen the independence of the Arab countries," the greater the hope for peace. And he insists that Soviet aid to the UAR in the form of "defense weapons" helped prepare the climate for a political settlement.

A PRAVDA article by Glukhov on the 19th, reviewed by TASS, claims that by its "inventions on 'movement of Egyptian rockets in the Suez Canal zone'" Israel is trying to preserve tension, poison the atmosphere, and thus prevent a political settlement. Another aim of "these insinuations," he claims, is to propel Washington to expand military assistance to Israel.

OTHER Moscow has made no particular attempt to
INCIDENTS exploit reports of Israeli operations against
 Jordan and Lebanon. TASS on the 14th did cite
a Jordanian army spokesman as announcing an attack by two Israeli planes on an area in the northern Jordan valley on the 13th, pointing out, without further comment, that this was the first Israeli air attack on Jordan since the cease-fire. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on the 18th makes the only other reference to attacks on Jordan, asserting that Israel's accusations against the UAR are aimed at distracting attention from the "real violations of the cease-fire" being perpetrated against Jordan.

Moscow has not reported the remark by UAR National Guidance Minister Haykal, in his 12 August press conference, about an incident three days previously when the Israelis shot three rounds at an Egyptian soldier--"as far as I know, the only violation of the cease-fire so far," Haykal said. TASS on the 14th carried the first monitored report of fedayeen activity since the cease-fire went into effect: A dispatch datelined Damascus noted a report of "intensified combat operations" by the as-Saiqah organization.

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USSR URGES PROMPT RESUMPTION OF JARRING MISSION

Propagandists express concern at the delay in the opening of talks under Jarring, noting that while favorable conditions exist, Israel still has not named its representative for the contacts. Domestic service broadcasts on the 14th and 15th noted problems arising over site and level of representation, Moscow pointing out that while the UAR and Jordan had authorized their UN delegates to hold consultations, "Israel, for some reason," simply does not want to agree on this level of representation." It does not acknowledge Israel's insistence that the talks be held at foreign minister level.

Panelists on the 16 August domestic service commentators' roundtable urge that the cease-fire period be used for "success of the Jarring mission": IZVESTIYA commentator Kudryavtsev calls for action toward a settlement, not toward resumption of military actions, observing that "certain representatives of Israeli ruling circles" are thinking more about what will happen in the military sense after the cease-fire period expires. And PRAVDA's Zhukov adds that no time should be wasted, but that work should begin and attention not be distracted by "sensational campaigns" emanating from Tel Aviv.

The 18 August Soltan commentary declares that the time to proceed to talks "arrived long ago," but that now no one can say confidently if or when the talks will begin due to Israel's "policy of provocations" and its failure to appoint its representative.

In an article in the 7 August NEW TIMES, apparently written prior to Israel's 4 August official acceptance of the U.S. initiative, PRAVDA's Belyayev brought up the suggestion of Big Four recommendations to Jarring, declaring it would be "perfectly logical" to activate the four-power consultations "to formulate coordinated recommendations" to Jarring. TASS had cited Nasir as stressing, in his 23 July speech, that Jarring should receive instructions and directives from the Big Four. But TASS' report on the 5 August meeting of the Big Four was couched in the customary terse format, merely announcing a "regular meeting" on "questions of a peaceful political settlement" in the Middle East, and

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made no mention of the statement issued after the meeting by Ambassador Yost that the four discussed developments favorable to the resumption of Jarring's mission and came to agreement on a communication to the Secretary General.

ISSUE OF Soviet media have not carried Kosygin's interview
WITHDRAWAL published in the New Delhi PATRIOT of 10 August
 in which he reiterated the Soviet position that
a political settlement and the establishment of a stable peace
in the Middle East "is possible solely on the condition of full
withdrawal" of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories,
on the basis of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November
1967. But other propaganda dwells on the need for complete
Israeli withdrawal: In the domestic service roundtable program
on the 16th Kudryavtsev maintained that withdrawal from "all"
occupied territories is the "main condition" for a settlement.
He pointed out that in Resolution 242 withdrawal comes first
in the first operative clause, but the Israelis would like to
"do everything backwards: first achieve a political settlement
and then withdraw the troops, but beyond a line different from
that from which they began the aggression."

Kudryavtsev made what appears to be Moscow's first suggestion
of the desirability of "good neighborly relations" among the
states of the region when he observed that the Security
Council resolution says the right of all Middle East
countries to live in peace and security within their
"former borders" must be guaranteed. These borders, he
said, should first of all be guaranteed "by the establishment
of good neighborly relations between the Middle East countries"
on the basis of mutual respect and acknowledgment of each
state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political
independence.

IRAQI-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE REFLECTS DISAGREEMENT ON MIDEAST

The communique on the 4-12 August visit to the USSR by an Iraqi
party-government delegation led by Saddam Husayn, deputy
chairman of the Revolution Command Council and deputy
secretary of the Baath Party Regional Command, is notable
for the lack of agreement it demonstrates on the Middle
East issue. While the document details the sides' views
on a variety of other international topics, it writes off
the Middle East in a single sentence stating brusquely that
the sides "also exchanged views on the current Middle East
situation."

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The communique on the last visit by a high-level Iraqi official to Moscow, that of Foreign Minister ash-Shaykhli in late March 1969, noted that the sides had "closely examined" the Middle East situation, and outlined their views on the need for immediate Israeli withdrawal, the threat to security posed by Israeli actions, and the "imperative need" to pool the efforts of "all Arab states in their struggle to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression." In the 1969 communique, the USSR reaffirmed its support for the Arab peoples' "just struggle" but there was no reference to the "legal rights" of the Arab Palestinian people, long a feature of Soviet-Arab communiques and appearing that same month in a communique on Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika's early March visit to the USSR.

PARTY The current communique on Saddam Husayn's visit
RELATIONS appears to be unique in Soviet-Arab communiques
 in that it casts the two sides' discussion of
international issues in the party rather than governmental
context. After listing the members of the delegations, the
communique touches on bilateral relations, and notes that
each side acquainted the other with party and national
activities and achievements. It then refers to "useful
meetings" held between CPSU and Baath Party representatives,
and proceeds to give the sides' views on a wide range of
international questions. There is no specific mention,
however, of party relations.

In the case of Nasir's 1968 and 1970 visits, party relationships were touched on at the end of the communique in the section on bilateral relations, as they were in the communique on the July 1969 visit of a Syrian party-government delegation led by head of state al-Atasi.*

ECONOMIC The Iraqi and Soviet sides, according to the
RELATIONS communique, expressed "satisfaction" with the
 present level of their countries' friendship
and cooperation in various fields, and their readiness to
expand cooperation. The Iraqi delegation thanked the Soviets

* The invitations to Nasir and al-Atasi were extended by the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government; Saddam Husayn visited at the invitation of the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

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for assistance in developing Iraq's economy, "preparing national cadres, and strengthening Iraq's defense power." The communique adds that "it was agreed to continue discussions for concluding agreements on various practical matters" in various fields of cooperation.

That economic talks continued after the delegation's departure on the 12th was indicated by Baghdad radio's 15 August report on the return that day of the economy minister "after signing the protocol on economic cooperation and trade relations agreed on during the recent talks" in Moscow. The same day, Moscow broadcast to Arabic listeners an interview with the minister after the protocol signing ceremony, in which he summed up Soviet-Iraqi cooperation "in many spheres," noting that the protocol offers "very good opportunities" for Iraq to supply the USSR with large quantities of crude oil as well as increasing the volume of exports of conventional Iraqi goods.

IRAQI CRITICISM OF SOCIALIST CAMP

An article in ATH-THAWRAH reviewed by Baghdad radio on the 13th, the day after Saddam Husayn's return from Moscow, makes perfectly clear Iraq's quarrel with the Soviet Union over the Palestinian issue, in the course of an attack on "local parties with international connections" and "this or that socialist country" for failing to understand the "Arab nationalist trend and Arab unity" and the "real concept of the Arab revolutionary movement." It professes to see a "profound harmony" between the Baath Party's views and the basic outlooks of the socialist camp despite these failings.

The paper frankly calls the "attitude toward the aspirations of the Arab Palestinian people" one of the "most prominent points of friction between our party and a sector of the socialist community," and it declares that an issue such as this must be faced in a manner which will "prevent our relations with this sector of the socialist forces from cracks and convulsions." Naming the "socialist sector" with whom the Baath disagrees, the paper concludes: It was from "this horizon of revolutionary understanding of the importance of the dialog and relations with the socialist community forces" that the Baath Party accepted the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government to send a party-government delegation.

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BUCHAREST CAUTIOUSLY APPROVES U.S. PEACE EFFORTS

Bucharest media's treatment of recent Middle East developments, while cautious and ostensibly neutral, reflects sympathy for the U.S. peace initiative. Coverage of events by Bucharest dailies has been limited to publication of dispatches from various Arab and other capitals on recent events, reporting both opposition to and support for the U.S. initiative. But while obscuring the specific nature of the opposition, the media provide more detailed statements of support for the peace plan and report remarks by President Nixon and Secretary Rogers. And the foreign affairs weekly LUMEA on 6 August printed the text of Secretary Rogers' 19 June letter to UAR Foreign Minister Riyadh with the innocent explanation that it was being published "in response to many readers who wanted to know the content of the Rogers' plan."

LUMEA also provided the only recent substantive comment on Middle East developments. An article in the same issue by Rodica Dumitrescu, dealing with world reaction to acceptance of the U.S. initiative, alluded to the "hostile attitude of some Arab countries" to a Middle East political settlement and noted PRAVDA's comment that "great political courage was needed to criticize these extremist attitudes, as Nasir did." LUMEA commented that by their attitude, "some countries such as Iraq, Syria, or Algeria are supporting the actions of those leaders of Palestinian organizations who are hostile to any political-diplomatic solution for the Middle East crisis." Pointing out that there are also opponents of a peaceful settlement in Israel, the weekly said that despite such difficulties there are reasons for optimism, and it noted in this context that at a recent press conference President Nixon "emphasized that the situation in the area seemed hopeless a year ago but now there is at least hope for a peaceful solution."

Bucharest has thus far not acknowledged Israeli charges of UAR cease-fire violations. The party organ SCINTEIA on the 15th did report an Israeli air attack on Jordanian army positions, citing an Israeli military spokesman as claiming that the army units had supported Palestinian commandos. That issue of the paper also failed for the first time in some weeks to carry a special section on the foreign affairs page under the heading "Events in the Middle East."

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Apart from LUMEA's citation of PRAVDA's praise for Nasir, Bucharest media have not mentioned Chinese or Soviet positions on the Middle East conflict. Bucharest itself has long supported a negotiated settlement of the dispute. The only one of Moscow's allies to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, Bucharest in August 1969 raised its **relations** from legation to embassy status, causing an appreciable cooling of Romanian-Arab relations. In recent months, however, Bucharest has seemed more critical of Israeli actions and at the same time has pressed for improved relations with the Arab states. On 13 May the Romanian Foreign Ministry condemned Israeli incursions into Lebanon, and the **next** day SCINTEIA charged Israel with increasing tension in the area. Romanian media had earlier played up a visit by Foreign Trade Minister Burtica to Cairo in March and subsequently publicized his attendance at an international fair in Cairo in May.

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STRATEGIC ARMS

VIENNA PHASE OF SALT HAILED, SENATE VOTE ON ABM SITES SCORED

The conclusion of the Vienna phase of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) has received little Soviet publicity except for the 14 August communique.* The only comment so far has appeared in a 16 August PRAVDA international review article by Ratiani; it draws from the communique in saying the exchanges of opinions were "useful" to both sides, permitting "a raising of the level of mutual understanding on a number of aspects of the questions under discussion," and in noting the talks will be continued in Helsinki in November. The author observes that the importance of the problems under discussion "is obvious to everyone" and that "a genuine limitation of the strategic arms race could be a fundamental factor in the matter of lessening international tension."

Soviet media have not carried Kosygin's interview, published in the Indian paper PATRIOT on the 10th, in which he said that the USSR approaches SALT with the "utmost seriousness" and that, "despite the complexity of the problem, we intend to continue the talks and seek ways of checking strategic arms."

VOTE ON SAFEGUARD Soviet propaganda on strategic-arms issues focuses on the 12 August Senate defeat of the Cooper-Hart amendment which would have withheld funds for additional Safeguard ABM sites--at Whiteman and Warren Air Force Bases. Moscow says defeat of the amendment, "by a slight majority" of five votes, was the result of pressure from the "military-industrial complex" and the White House.** A Strelnikov article in PRAVDA on 14 August says "cynicism and speculations of an

* Last December a spate of Moscow press and radio comment promptly followed the release of the communique on the Helsinki phase.

** Soviet propaganda on the 6 August 1969 Senate vote on ABM deployment had also viewed the outcome as a victory for the "military-industrial complex," but had concluded that the narrow margin augured well for SALT and was reflective of a cognizance in the Senate of the dangers of the military-industrial complex. For a review of comment following last year's vote, see the FBIS TRENDS for 13 August 1969, pages 23-24 and for 27 August 1969, pages 14-15.

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anti-Soviet nature" played a role in that "some top Presidential advisers even claimed that the expansion of the Safeguard system will 'strengthen' the U.S. position at the Soviet-U.S. talks" in Vienna. While Strelnikov does not comment on such "speculations," an article in RED STAR the following day on the vote quotes Senator Mansfield for the statement that the decision to expand Safeguard "could exert a negative influence on the prospects of SALT." And the Russian PRAVDA article of the 16th, noting that advocates of Safeguard see it as a "trump for trading," concludes that Senate approval of the ABM system does "not promote the search for mutually acceptable international decisions."

Propagandists take the President to task for his recent vetoes of education and housing bills on the pretext of economy and his support for expanding the Safeguard system. Thus a 12 August domestic service commentary says that the position of the Administration "looks particularly unpleasant because it reduces the allocations for solving acute domestic problems and demands increased spending on Safeguard, a project of incalculable cost and a great danger." A IZVESTIYA article on the 14th notes that while the President imposed vetoes on education and housing bills to combat inflation, the White House voiced "irritation" over the efforts of some Senators to cut expenditures on ABM systems.

TASS reports promptly that Secretary Laird on "Issues and Answers" on the 16th indicated that the Pentagon had sent a letter to the Senate Armed Forces Committee recommending against adoption of the Brooke amendment which "with certain reservations provides for banning appropriations for building additional Safeguard launching pads."

Available Soviet propaganda on the Senate vote does not mention the telegram from the chief U.S. negotiator at Vienna suggesting that support of the Administration on Safeguard is important to the success of SALT. But an article in Warsaw's SLOWO POWSZECHNE on the 15th, reviewed by PAP, says that Senator Jackson circulated copies of the "confidential" message from Smith which "justified the need of the construction of the Safeguard system as a valuable bargaining trump in negotiations with the Russians." The article goes on to conclude that the Senate's decision on Safeguard "has not slammed the door" on the third round of talks scheduled for Helsinki, largely because of the patience of the Soviet negotiators and Moscow's persistence in seeking international detente.

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FRG-SOVIET TREATY

USSR STRESSES EUROPEAN SECURITY ASPECT, DOWNPLAYS BERLIN ISSUE

In voluminous propaganda following the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty on 12 August, Moscow calls the event a landmark in the history of postwar Europe and welcomes the "step toward realism" taken by the West German Government under Chancellor Brandt. The media give wide play to the document's key passages on the nonuse of force, the inviolability of frontiers, and the territorial integrity of all the states in Europe.*

Moscow views the accord as a significant contribution to European security and to the improvement of relations between states in Europe. In the words of the communique on Brandt's visit to the USSR for the signing ceremony, released in Moscow media on 13 August, the treaty "will help strengthen security in Europe, solve problems existing there, and establish peaceful cooperation between all European states irrespective of the difference in their social systems." According to TASS on the 12th, both Brandt and Brezhnev, following their meeting on that day, expressed confidence that the treaty "opens up possibilities for a further development of relations between the two countries and for the strengthening of European security." Kosygin, in his widely publicized 12 August speech at a dinner in Brandt's honor, described the treaty as a turning point in relations between the two states which would contribute to the improvement of the situation in Europe and in the world.

Stressing the importance of the treaty for the development of bilateral relations, Moscow propaganda has emphasized the broadening of trade and other ties. Soviet media have not been heard to comment on the announcement, in the 13 August communique on Brandt's visit, that Kosygin has been invited to pay a return official visit to the FRG.

* The text of the treaty was released by TASS late on the 12th and appeared in the press the following day.

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Typifying the comment on the broadening of bilateral ties, a participant in the 16 August domestic service commentators' roundtable show took note of the favorable reaction to the treaty among West German business circles, who have observed that "both sides can benefit." A 13 August domestic service commentary says that the president of a West German industrial association, after welcoming the treaty, "immediately raised the question of the need to consolidate this success by means of a FRG-USSR trade agreement." According to the commentator, the industrialist has indicated that the FRG's trade with the East will eventually increase to eight or nine percent of total West German foreign trade.

The propaganda gives predictably wide play to worldwide approbation of the accord, noting at the same time that opposition voices have been heard. In his 12 August speech, Kosygin took note of the "immense attention" given the FRG-Soviet talks in Europe and elsewhere, concluding that the voices of "ill-wishers . . . are voices of those who do not have a sense of political realism and who are not concerned about the peaceful future of the European peoples." The 13 August PRAVDA editorial repeats this line, without attribution to Kosygin, and echoes Kosygin in calling the accord "a political act dictated by life itself" corresponding to the long-term interests of peace. A PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS on the 18th says that the keynote of world press commentaries on the treaty is "satisfaction" and that the voices of opposition "sound a sharp discord against the background of the overall favorable reaction."

Numerous Soviet commentaries single out the chief opposition to the treaty as the "rightist" forces in West Germany--the CDU/CSU, the NPD, and their backers. Thus a dispatch by TASS commentator Orlov on the 15th points to the "fierce attack" on the treaty by the "neofascist" National Democratic Party and "the grumbling and discontent voiced by those politicians of the CDU/CSU camp who are guided by outdated doctrines." Citing the West German press, Orlov says that CSU Chairman Strauss has been particularly active in his efforts "to scare the public by inventions about alleged 'disastrous consequences' of the treaty."

PRAVDA observer Zhukov, participating in the Moscow domestic service roundtable show on the 16th, was critical of the "mutterings from the reactionary camp where such

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die-hards as Franz Josef Strauss and others have already begun to snarl" over the agreement. Earlier in the same broadcast, Zhukov had credited the present FRG leadership with showing "an understanding of the political reality in contemporary Europe." A commentary in RED STAR on 14 August says that a "fierce campaign is being waged in the FRG against the treaty by the newspapers and magazines of the Springer concern--the spokesman of the country's most reactionary and militaristic circles."

BERLIN Moscow's domestic service on the 13th promptly
ISSUE reported Secretary Rogers' statement that day endorsing the treaty "as a first step in a process leading to an improvement of the situation in Europe." The report, however, ignored the Secretary's remarks on the need for Soviet cooperation in bringing about improvements for the people of Berlin.

Moscow's East European allies gave the Berlin problem some attention in treating the FRG-Soviet treaty negotiations.* An article in Prague's MLADA FRONTA on 29 July, appearing two days after the resumption of Scheel's talks with Gromyko, stated that ratification of the treaty by the Bundestag will "meet with difficulties" since the FRG Government "makes progress in the negotiations on Berlin between the four powers a condition for ratification." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 9 August, in a report of reaction to the initialing of the treaty on the 7th, quoted the Deputy Mayor of West Berlin to the effect that the treaty would "become a mere scrap of paper if West Berlin is excluded." The same paper the following day, reviewing a TRYBUNA LUDU article, included the latter's observation that ratification by West Germany "will be possible only after an accord on the question of West Berlin has been reached among the four powers."

* The only known Soviet mention of the Berlin problem in comment surrounding the FRG-Soviet treaty appears in an article in LIFE ABROAD (No. 32), the text of which is not yet available here. The article reportedly draws on Western press reports on West German efforts to include the question of West Berlin in the proposed agreement with the USSR. Moscow has not acknowledged the FRG's 8 August note to the Western Big Three--released by Bonn as an accompanying document to the treaty--assuring them that the agreement with Moscow does not affect the rights of the four powers in Berlin.

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Moscow's virtual avoidance of the Berlin issue is in keeping with its low-key treatment of the periodic four-power meetings on the problem. In characteristic fashion, TASS on 21 July had reported without comment that the ambassadors of the four powers met earlier that day and that the next meeting would be held in September. An atypical and unusually detailed discussion of the Berlin problem had appeared in an article by V. Boldyrev in NEW TIMES (No. 25, dated 24 June). The article referred briefly to the ambassadorial meetings and went on to discourse at some length on the features which West Berlin has "in common with such recognized 'city-states' as the Vatican." In Boldyrev's words, the USSR and the GDR, "inside whose territory West Berlin is situated," have made a "big concession" toward reducing tension and strengthening European security in allowing the city to exist as an enclave with its own state and political structure. It is hoped, the commentator continued, that the Western powers, "if they really want detente and normalization of the situation," will take an "equally sober stand."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

NEW SOVIET CHIEF NEGOTIATOR ILICHEV ARRIVES IN PEKING

Against a background of continuing mutual polemical restraint, both Moscow and Peking reported the arrival in Peking of deputy foreign minister Ilichev as the new head of the Soviet delegation to the border talks. Ilichev's arrival followed closely upon Kosygin's assertions, made in an interview carried by an Indian newspaper, that the Peking talks are continuing and that an agreement has been reached between the two governments on the exchange of ambassadors. Neither side took note of the first anniversary of the 13 August armed clash on the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border, and both continue to withhold comment on the annual session of the joint Sino-Soviet commission for border river navigation which opened on 10 July.

In reporting Ilichev's arrival in Peking on 15 August, both TASS and NCNA noted that he was met at the airport by the head and deputy head of the PRC delegation to the talks. On his original arrival last October Kuznetsov was met by his Chinese counterpart; but on his return to Peking on 2 January 1970 following a three-week absence he was met by only the deputy head of the Chinese delegation. Neither Moscow nor Peking had previously revealed that Kuznetsov had returned to Moscow. Both NCNA and TASS cited reasons of health for his replacement, but only NCNA noted that his return took place on 30 June. TASS stated that Kuznetsov has now resumed his duties as Soviet first deputy foreign minister.

Reiterating the Soviet Government's desire to settle "all problems concerning Soviet-Chinese relations by way of negotiations," Kosygin, in an interview published on 10 August in the New Delhi PATRIOT, reaffirmed Moscow's intent to persist in the talks despite dissatisfaction with "the development of Soviet-Chinese relations." Stressing that "talks are continuing" and that "there are no armed clashes at present on the Soviet-Chinese border," Kosygin contended that "progress here depends not on the Soviet side alone." He did not go on, as he did in his 10 June election speech, his last public comment on China, to attack the Chinese for impeding the negotiations. Noting that agreement had been reached on the exchange of ambassadors, he stated that the Soviet ambassador "will shortly leave for Peking, with the Chinese ambassador evidently coming to Moscow."

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Soviet central media have not originated any comment on China since early June, but persist in pressing Moscow's views on Chinese developments indirectly through exploitation of continuing East European media comment. LITERARY GAZETTE on 5 August carried three articles from the East European press: a Bulgarian article on militarization in China, a Polish article on the alleged PRC-U.S. rapprochement, and a Hungarian article on Peking's use of its mass media. In its 12 August issue, LITERARY GAZETTE carried anti-Chinese comment for the third consecutive week with the reprinting of a Bulgarian press article condemning Chinese policies on the ground they benefit the United States. A TASS review indicated that LIFE ABROAD on 14 August carried its third article on China in four weeks. In contrast to the first two, which were reprints of East European press comment on Chinese affairs, the current issue contains an "international review" with one of its sections devoted to criticism of "American propaganda centers which are trying to worsen Soviet-Chinese relations." The review drew attention to a recent "provocative" Washington STAR report, also cited by Kosygin in his interview, which allegedly contended that the Soviet Union and China are approaching a "new confrontation" and that "highly-placed quarters in the Nixon government" take quite seriously the possibility that Moscow will deal "a pre-emptive strike against China."

While Soviet media have not specifically elaborated on the 2 August SOVIET RUSSIA article declaring Soviet intention to farm two disputed Soviet-held islands in the Amur near Khabarovsk, and Peking has refrained from mentioning the article, a Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 16 August recalled the 1956 Sino-Soviet agreement to undertake jointly surveys in the Amur River valley to determine the availability and productivity of natural resources there. Noting that "some joint efforts were made to study natural conditions in accordance with this agreement," the commentary alleged that a further survey of the Amur River area "was suspended" in the early 1960's "due to the fault of China." Another Mandarin broadcast on 18 August reported that representatives of local consumer cooperatives in Khabarovsk and Amur have begun trade negotiations in Khabarovsk City with representatives of the Heilungkiang trade organization.

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Sustaining its longstanding polemical restraint toward the Soviet Union, Peking has carried no comment in its own name on the Soviet-West German treaty. Persisting, however, in its practice of taking periodic indirect swipes at "Soviet revisionism," NCNA on 14 August transmitted a speech by an Albanian leader in Peking accusing the "Moscow renegade clique" of "collusion with the West so that it can free itself from Europe and concentrate its strength on other areas, particularly opposing the PRC in Asia."

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K O R E A

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF LIBERATION FROM JAPAN OBSERVED

Moscow marks the 25th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese domination (15 August) as it had decennial anniversaries and sends a party-government delegation to Pyongyang headed by Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers Mazurov. The usual greetings messages are exchanged by the two countries' leaders. But there is no PRAVDA editorial as there was in 1965, the 20th anniversary, nor does Moscow give the event as much attention as it did that year, although broadcast propaganda does exceed that devoted to the ordinary annual observance last year. The anniversary was marked in Moscow by a public meeting on the 13th attended by Party Secretary Katushev, and on the 17th the DPRK Ambassador gave his usual reception, attended by Politburo member Pelshe. In 1965 Polyanskiy had addressed both the Moscow meeting and the DPRK Ambassador's reception.

The events in Pyongyang include a city meeting at which the ranking Korean official was First Deputy Premier Kim Il and speeches were given by Second Deputy Premier Pak Song-chol and Mazurov. Both Mazurov and Pak routinely praise Soviet-Korean friendship, Pak duly thanking the Soviets for their role in liberating Korea and for subsequent aid and Mazurov hailing the Soviet-DPRK treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance as an important factor of peace in the Far East. In 1965, when Shelepin led the Soviet delegation, the meeting was held in Wonson, addressed by Kim Il, and attended by Kim Il-song. In 1965 Kim Il-song had addressed a Cabinet banquet, but this year, although he attended the banquet, Kim Il spoke. This year, Kim Il-song received the Soviet guests, as is customary, for a "friendly talk."

Peking's meager attention to the anniversary consists only of NCNA reports of the Pyongyang meeting, of a meeting of Korean residents in Japan, and of a South Vietnamese LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY commentary. The report of the Pyongyang meeting notes that the PRC Ambassador was present, a fact which KCNA had not specified. A PRC delegation led by Wu Hsin-yu, deputy general secretary of the NPC Standing Committee, had attended anniversary events in Pyongyang in 1965, although the group apparently had not come specifically for that purpose, not having been described as an anniversary delegation when it arrived. It is

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customary for Pyongyang to invite to anniversary observances foreign delegations which happen to be in the capital at the time. Other Peking attention in 1965 had included a congratulatory message signed by Mao, Liu Shao-chi, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai.

PRC ROLE IN LIBERATION In his speech at the Pyongyang meeting Pak Song-chol says that during the war Kim Il-song's anti-Japanese guerrilla army "defended the Soviet Union with arms" and "fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Chinese people" as well as "hand-in-hand with the Soviet army." This part of the speech is carried in full in a lengthy NCNA summary of Pak's speech, but a TASS report published in PRAVDA only cites his references to the Soviet army's assistance to Kim's guerrillas.

Routine-level Moscow propaganda generally stresses that it was the Red Army that liberated Korea, glossing over the effort of Kim's guerrilla army, although Mazurov, in his Pyongyang speech, does say that the victory over Japan was "made by the combat community of the Soviet army and the armed forces of the Korean people, China, and Mongolia." An anniversary commentary carried by Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin on 14 August recalls that the "united action of the Korean, Chinese, and Soviet peoples in the struggle against imperialism and for the freedom and independence of people's Korea was very effective." It adds that if the Chinese leaders "did not carry out splittist activities and if they responded to the call of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in forming a united front against imperialism," the Korean people's struggle for unification of the country and withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea would be more effective.

CONCERN OVER JAPAN POLICY In a thinly-veiled criticism of the Soviet attitude toward Japan, Pak Song-chol in his Pyongyang meeting speech warns that the danger of Japanese militarism "must not be underestimated" and "no illusion should be entertained" about it. He says that the struggle against Japanese militarism should not be weakened "on the pretext that one can take advantage of the contradictions between the United States and Japan." He further criticizes "those who disregard the general interests

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of the anti-imperialist struggle, neglect the struggle against Japanese militarism, and take a stand of national egoism and pursue only their own immediate interests."*

Pak makes the criticism all the more pointed when, in the course of reviewing Korean support for people's revolutionary struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, he includes a stock expression of support for the Chinese people's struggle to liberate Taiwan and then gratuitously recalls that the Korean and Chinese people have "fought jointly for a long time against Japanese and U.S. imperialism, their common enemies. Today they are standing on the same front in the struggle, and will in the future struggle to the end shoulder to shoulder against U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism."

NCNA carries all of these remarks in its lengthy summary of the speech, but the TASS summary published in PRAVDA naturally omits them.

* Pyongyang has periodically expressed concern that the socialist countries not ignore the dangers of Japanese militarism, and a lengthy NODONG SIMNUN article on 30 March recounting the evils of Japanese militarism had warned in this context against acting on the basis of "national egoism" and ignoring the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle while blinded by "momentary interests." This article is discussed in connection with Chou En-lai's April visit to North Korea in the 8 April 1970 FBIS TRENDS, pages 10-12.

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CHILE

CASTRO ENDORSES CHILEAN ELECTORAL PATH TO SOCIALISM

In the course of a seven-hour 1 August interview with a Chilean delegation in Havana to attend the 26 July anniversary celebration, Castro made his first comment on the 4 September Chilean presidential elections, flatly setting forth his belief that "in Chile in 1970 socialism can win an election victory." He made it clear that his endorsement of the electoral path to socialism did not apply to Latin America as a whole, by avowing that Chile is "one of the few countries where institutional regimes and electoral traditions exist." In explaining his position he declared that "armed struggle is not a dogma," but "no other country has Chile's conditions at this time."

Castro's comments were carried in the Chilean paper PURO CHILE on the 4th and by PRENSA LATINA the next day, but they were ignored by other Cuban media. PURO CHILE is the organ of the Popular Unity Movement, the electoral organization dominated by the communist and socialist parties which is backing Salvador Allende's candidacy.

CASTRO'S MOTIVES Although Castro has long maintained--with occasional deviations--that Chile and Uruguay may be exceptions to his cherished dictum that armed struggle is the correct path to revolution in Latin America, the question remains as to why he chose to publicize his endorsement of revolution via the ballot box in Chile after having remained silent on the matter through most of the election campaign. The pronouncement is consistent with his embracing of a doctrine of multiple paths to revolution in his 22 April Lenin Day speech, and like that speech seems related to his desire to establish diplomatic relations with Chile, with which he concluded an agreement to purchase agricultural products early this year. By supporting the revolutionary legitimacy of electoral participation, Castro in effect has dissociated himself from the Chilean Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) and other extreme leftist groups who identify with the Cuban revolution and who have engaged in revolutionary violence while denigrating the electoral path and its adherents. He thereby neutralizes the arguments of Chilean rightist sectors who allege that Cuban support of Chilean groups dedicated to revolutionary violence makes expanded relations with Castro inadvisable.

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During his interview, Castro appeared to argue that Cuban assistance to Latin American revolutionary movements is justified by the fact that Latin American states have violated international law in collaborating in anti-Cuban actions. And he made it clear that states which did not participate in these actions need not fear Cuban assistance to domestic revolutionaries: "Can anyone impugn the right of Cuba to help the revolutionary movement when all international norms have been violated against it? If these were respected we would have to heed them." In a July 1964 New York TIMES interview, Castro employed a similar line in bidding for improved relations with the United States.

When questioned about renewed relations with Chile, Castro declared that this issue should "wait until after the elections," but admitted his great interest in reestablishing these relations: "We are interested in opening relations with only a few countries, among them Chile, and perhaps in the case of Chile we have the most interest." Stating that Cuba was interested in relations with Latin American states only in the context of "the anti-imperialist struggle," he indicated that if Chile were to resume relations with Cuba it would fulfill this specification because "opening up relations with Cuba would be an open defiance of U.S. interests." Castro noted approvingly that the Chilean Foreign Ministry had opposed OAS agreements on Cuba and that Chile unlike Mexico and other Latin American countries did not participate in dividing up the Cuban sugar quota in the U.S. market. During his 22 April speech Castro had for the first time lauded Chile for approving the export of food products to Cuba and publicly opposing the blockade of Cuba.

Although Castro and other Cuban spokesmen for over a year have indicated an interest in reestablishing relations with Peru, and this interest appeared to be one factor in the prompt earthquake disaster aid Cuba sent to Peru, Castro now appears to regard the resumption of these relations as unlikely. "We are not so interested in opening relations with Peru," he told his Chilean interviewers; if ties were renewed "imperialism would use it as a pretext to attack the present Peruvian Government," and thus "to press for the establishment of relations with Peru would be equivalent to hurting the present Peruvian process."

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Another factor that may have contributed to his endorsement of the Chilean electoral process was revealed by Castro, in the interview, when he evinced sensitivity to the use of anti-Cuban election materials against Allende, who has long had close ties with the Cuban ruler. Recalling that a campaign of lies against the Cuban revolution was employed in the last Chilean presidential election in 1964 when Allende was defeated, Castro confessed: "We feel guilty about what happened." The reason he cited for wishing to defer opening of relations with Chile until after the elections was that he did not want to take the risk that Cuba would become "involved" in the elections. And he alleged that his 26 July speech, in which he catalogued and accepted responsibility for Cuban economic failures, was being distorted for electoral purposes in Chile "in order to involve the Cuban revolution in the Chilean process."

Charging that the Chilean rightist press was distorting his 26 July speech, Castro challenged those who speak about Cuban failures to criticize the weaknesses and problems faced by their own peoples and see if they receive the same kind of "enthusiastic" response he received from the Cuban people. The speech apparently has in fact arisen as an issue during the Chilean electoral campaign. PRENSA LATINA's correspondent in Santiago in a 4 August information dispatch to his home office reported that Allende, questioned on a Chilean TV program, contrasted Castro's speeches with those by Chilean President Frei, who speaks only of "successes" while "never . . . mentioning that there are more than 300,000 unemployed in Chile." "An honest ruler like Fidel," Allende declared, "points out achievements and goals not achieved."

CUBA A Despite Castro's expression of concern lest the
CAMPAIGN ISSUE Cuban revolution become an issue in the cam-
 paign, Havana media have reported that it has
indeed become one. A PRENSA LATINA commentary on the 14th
stated that the campaign now revolved "around a single theme:
the Cuban revolution." It noted that Manuel Urrutia, President
of Cuba immediately after the revolution triumphed, was in
Chile to campaign for rightist candidate Jorge Allesandri,
and reported that Castro's 26 July speech had caused the
rightist forces to utilize anti-Cuban campaign propaganda.
The Chilean right charged that the 26 July speech constituted
an admission of "the failure of the only socialist experience
in Latin America," PRENSA LATINA reported, with Rightist
publicists adopting the slogan "a vote for Allende will doom
Chile to the same disaster."

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Despite Castro's relatively optimistic assessment of Allende's chances in the election, Cuban comment prior to the 1 August interview pointed to the possibility of a military coup taking place even before the elections. A 31 July PRENSA LATINA commentary concluded that "six weeks before the election it is still doubtful they will be held."

BACKGROUND: Castro's decision to voice support of the electoral path to revolution may be related to a rapprochement with the Chilean CP--which in the past has been at loggerheads with Cuba because of its preference for traditional politicking over revolutionary violence. (The Chilean CP's organ EL SIGLO has published Castro's 1 August remarks.) The question of Castro's position on the elections may have come up in June when Chilean Communist Senator Volodia Teitelboim visited Cuba and had lengthy conversations with Castro. Although Havana media did not publicize the visit at the time, PRENSA LATINA on 24 July reported a Teitelboim speech in the Chilean Senate honoring Cuba, in which he affirmed that relations between his party and Cuba "were never broken" and quoted Castro as saying "we might have had differences of opinion but never a problem."

Frictions between Cuba and the Chilean party had emerged last February when EL SIGLO carried an interview with a Chilean communist youth leader back from Havana in which it was alleged that Castro had excoriated Latin American guerrilla movements and lauded Chile and Uruguay as "institutional oases," at the same time commending the Chilean "mass movement." The Cuban Communist youth organization issued a statement claiming that Castro's words had been "distorted," and condemning use of the Cuban revolution's "prestige" to support "psuedorevolutionary stands."

Prior to Castro's 1 August remarks, the only Cuban leader publicly to discuss the question of revolutionary strategy in Chile during the past year was Cuban CP Secretariat member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. In a 30 September interview in the Chilean Castro-oriented publication PUNTO FINAL, Rodriguez pointed out that even if the revolution could triumph via the ballot box in Chile it would be necessary to utilize violence to maintain power: "... the Chilean revolutionaries must be prepared for a struggle in which violence will be the decisive element, even in the case of their obtaining power by the nonviolent electoral road." In available versions of Castro's 1 August remarks, he did not address himself to the problem of the retention of power in the event of a Leftist electoral victory.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

LENINGRAD PARTY LEADER IS APPARENTLY SIDETRACKED

The conspicuous absence of Leningrad oblast First Secretary V.S. Tolstikov from important official functions in July appears to lend credence to reports that he is scheduled to become the new Soviet ambassador to China. Tolstikov's exile to Peking would clearly represent a blow to his political fortunes, which have been on the rise in recent years. Tolstikov's age (53), his illustrious record of accomplishment in Leningrad, and the widespread praise it has received clearly enhanced his credentials as a contender for higher political office.

TOLSTIKOV'S ABSENCE Judging from the central press (Leningrad papers are not available abroad), Tolstikov was last reported in Leningrad on 16 June when he delivered a report to a Leningrad obkom plenum (SOVIET RUSSIA, 18 June). Although he was not among the speakers at the 30 June-1 July RSFSR Supreme Soviet session or the 2-3 July Central Committee plenum, he did attend the 14-15 July USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow and was reelected a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (PRAVDA, 16 July).

In July, however, Tolstikov failed to attend any prominent Leningrad functions (an obkom plenum, an oblast trade union plenum, and an oblast meeting to adopt obligations in honor of the 24th congress). While other regional party organizations convened plenums in early of mid-July to discuss the 2-3 July Central Committee agriculture plenum, the Leningrad plenum was held on 28 July and--in contrast to the other plenums--was addressed by the second secretary instead of the first secretary. Tolstikov was not even reported as being present. Second Secretary G.V. Romanov again substituted for Tolstikov at the 5-7 August national seminar on production associations in Leningrad.

OUTSTANDING CAREER Tolstikov's political career in Leningrad has been marked by numerous innovations as well as by unusually favorable publicity. Leningrad pioneered in the establishment of industrial production associations (in 1962) and has championed the innovation against ministerial opposition. The first scientific-production associations were also created in Leningrad for the purpose of accelerating the application of technology in production.

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Leningrad's work in this field was approved by the CPSU Central Committee early this year, although no official announcement of this action was made; references to it were made by Leningraders or their admirers (Leningrad city secretary Yu. Zavarukhin in PARTY LIFE, No. 5; a Leningrad association director M. Panfilov in PARTY LIFE, No. 8; ECONOMIC GAZETTE, No. 5; Belorussian Secretary A. Smirnov in SOVIET BELORUSSIA, 9 April; and Shelepin in his June election speech).

Leningrad's production associations have been praised by the leading economic reformers (A. Birman in the December NOVY MIR; P. Bunich and N. Fedorenko in the 9 February PRAVDA) and bureaucrats (Gosplan deputy chairman A. Bachurin in the June QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY). The potentialities of production associations were emphasized by Mazurov and Polyanskiy in their June election speeches, while Shelepin praised Leningrad for being first to establish such associations and cited the Central Committee's approval of Leningrad's work. In the past few days Leningrad has again been the focus of attention in the central press in connection with the national seminar on production associations held there on 5-7 August and attended by Central Committee officials, industrial leaders, and republic party and government leaders.

Other Leningrad initiatives have been emulated elsewhere. According to the July issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, Leningrad's system of social planning in industrial enterprises "has quickly spread throughout the country." Leningrad's strict methods of enforcing labor discipline foreshadowed the national campaign begun at the December 1969 Central Committee plenum. These methods were described by Leningrad city First Secretary G.I. Popov in the 8 February 1970 PRAVDA as the national campaign got under way. K.A. Novikov, Chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Use of Labor Resources, approvingly cited Leningrad's system for cutting absentism by one-third in six months (TRUD, 27 June), while Popov bragged that job turnovers had been cut by five percent and disciplinary infractions by one-third in the second half of 1969 (TRUD, 1 August).

Leningrad under Tolstikov has also achieved an enviable record in raising labor productivity. At the 16 June Leningrad plenum Tolstikov bragged that the rise in industrial production in Leningrad during 1970 was entirely attributable to increased labor productivity (Radio Moscow, 16 June) and in an April

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KOMMUNIST article he boasted of the success of Leningrad's production associations, its long-range social development plans and its education of scientific-technical and artistic intelligentsia. These achievements prompted Estonian Premier V. Klauson to advise economic leaders to study "the wealth of experience of our nearest neighbors, especially Leningrad and Leningrad oblast in the organization and management of production," instead of studying the experience of foreign countries; and he urged Estonian party organizations to adopt the party-organizational and educational experience of Leningrad enterprises (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 26 February).

LINK SYSTEM OF FARMING GAINS ADDITIONAL SUPPORT

In July two regional party leaders--V.I. Konotop of Moscow oblast and P.M. Masherov of Belorussia--joined the ranks of those seeking reforms in farm labor organization and wages. Konotop, writing in the July issue of KOMMUNIST, publicly endorsed the link system of farming, while Masherov, addressing a Belorussian agricultural plenum on 23 July, recommended reforms that would incorporate the basic features of the link system (SOVIET BELORUSSIA, 24 July). At the same time, articles publicizing the achievements of mechanized links and exposing the deficiencies of the traditional brigade system have continued to appear in the central press.

Konotop's article stressed the "great possibilities" for raising agricultural productivity offered by the link system. It cited the example of a mechanized link in a Moscow oblast sovkhos which had nearly doubled the farm's average yields of grain production last year. Significantly, Konotop attributed this success to the abolition of norms and directives in the link and to the introduction of an incentive system based on the volume and quality of the harvest. As a result, Konotop noted approvingly, the average monthly wage in the link had risen "substantially" over the level of 175 rubles reached in 1967.

Konotop's endorsement of the link system appears to be in response to pressure exerted by Politburo member Voronov earlier this year. At a 21 March Moscow conference of agricultural workers, Voronov criticized the oblast hierarchy for lagging in the introduction of the link system, and he urged the oblast to become a pivotal base for the development of the "progressive" innovation.

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Although Masherov's report to the Belorussian Central Committee plenum avoided mention of the link system, his proposals for reform were clearly consistent with the basic features of the controversial innovation. Masherov categorically declared that the traditional brigade system of labor organization and the norm system of wages are "patently obsolete" because they "provide inadequate incentive to increase labor productivity and output." As an alternative, he proposed the creation of "mechanized production subdivisions" whose members would be remunerated "for the final work results and the harvest, not for the fulfillment of norms for individual types of work." In advancing this proposal, however, Masherov took cognizance of the failure of agricultural scientists to prepare "scientifically substantiated recommendations" in this field.

Similar, though less authoritative, support for the link system has continued in the central press since the July CPSU agricultural plenum. An article in PARTY LIFE No. 14 (7 July) by a raykom first secretary from Altay kray described how mechanized links had been successfully introduced in his bailiwick after large brigades were found to be unmanageable. The article revealed that the raykom was now planning to extend the tenure of the links "for a number of years" in order to enable them to cope with crop rotation and become "complete masters of the land." The question of tenure has been a focal point of contention in the controversy over the link system, as evidenced by the deletion of the provision on tenure in the final version of the Model Kolkhoz Charter adopted last November.

Other articles on the work of "unregulated" mechanized links appeared in SOVIET RUSSIA on 30 July and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 1 August. These accounts were uniformly favorable, as was the sketch of one of the pioneers of the link movement, Vladimir Svetlichnyy, in NEDELYA No. 30 (20-26 July).

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